The White House wants to ‘cryptographically verify’ videos of Joe Biden so viewers don’t mistake them for AI deepfakes::Biden’s AI advisor Ben Buchanan said a method of clearly verifying White House releases is “in the works.”

  • /home/pineapplelover@lemm.ee
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    1 year ago

    Huh. They actually do something right for once instead of spending years trying to ban A.I tools. I’m pleasantly surprised.

  • ryannathans@aussie.zone
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    1 year ago

    I have said for years all media that needs to be verifiable needs to be signed. Gpg signing lets gooo

  • CyberSeeker@discuss.tchncs.de
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    1 year ago

    Digital signature as a means of non repudiation is exactly the way this should be done. Any official docs or releases should be signed and easily verifiable by any public official.

  • drathvedro@lemm.ee
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    1 year ago

    I’ve been saying for a long time now that camera manufacturers should just put encryption circuits right inside the sensors. Of course that wouldn’t protect against pointing the camera at a screen showing a deepfake or someone painstakingly dissolving top layers and tracing out the private key manually, but that’d be enough of the deterrent from forgery. And also media production companies should actually put out all their stuff digitally signed. Like, come on, it’s 2024 and we still don’t have a way to find out if something was filmed or rendered, cut or edited, original or freebooted.

    • hyperhopper@lemmy.world
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      1 year ago

      If you’ve been saying this for a long time please stop. This will solve nothing. It will be trivial to bypass for malicious actors and just hampers normal consumers.

      • drathvedro@lemm.ee
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        1 year ago

        You must be severely misunderstanding the idea. The idea is not to encrypt it in a way that it’s only unlockable by a secret and hidden key, like DRM or cable TV does, but to do the the reverse - to encrypt it with a key that is unlockable by publicly available and widely shared key, where successful decryption acts as a proof of content authenticity. If you don’t care about authenticity, nothing is stopping you from spreading the decrypted version, so It shouldn’t affect consumers one bit. And I wouldn’t describe “Get a bunch of cameras, rip the sensors out, carefully and repeatedly strip the top layers off and scan using electron microscope until you get to the encryption circuit, repeat enough times to collect enough scans undamaged by the stripping process to then manually piece them together and trace out the entire circuit, then spend a few weeks debugging it in a simulator to work out the encryption key” as “trivial”

        • hyperhopper@lemmy.world
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          1 year ago

          I think you are misunderstanding things or don’t know shit about cryptography. Why the fuck are y even talking about publicly unlockable encryption, this is a use case for verification like a MAC signature, not any kind of encryption.

          And no, your process is wild. The actual answer is just replace the sensor input to the same encryption circuits. That is trivial if you own and have control over your own device. For your scheme to work, personal ownership rights would have to be severely hampered.

          • Natanael@slrpnk.net
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            1 year ago

            A MAC is symmetric and can thus only be verified by you or somebody who you trust to not misuse or leak the key. Regular digital signatures is what’s needed here

            You can still use such a signing circuit but treat it as an attestation by the camera’s owner, not as independent proof of authenticity.